Beyond Agency Theory: Reconceptualizing Principal–Agent Dynamics Through Behavioral Stewardship and Asymmetric Information Governance in Multinational Corporations

Abstract

Agency theory has long served as the dominant paradigm for explaining governance structures within multinational corporations (MNCs), yet its reductive assumptions regarding opportunism and self-interest increasingly fail to account for observed managerial behaviors in complex, cross-cultural organizational environments. This study critically re-evaluates principal–agent relationships by integrating behavioral stewardship theory, asymmetric information governance, and institutional logics to construct a revised theoretical framework applicable to contemporary MNC governance. Employing a mixed-methods design combining structured meta-analysis of 214 empirical studies (2005–2023) with qualitative case interrogation across six high-income economies, the findings demonstrate that stewardship orientations systematically outperform agency-aligned incentive structures in environments characterized by high institutional uncertainty and stakeholder complexity. The proposed framework offers actionable reconceptualizations for board governance design, executive compensation architecture, and subsidiary control mechanisms.