Agency Cost Structures vs. Stewardship Governance Mechanisms: A Dyadic Evaluation of Principal–Agent Alignment in Publicly Listed Conglomerates Under Asymmetric Information Regimes

Abstract

This study conducts a rigorous comparative evaluation of agency-theoretic and stewardship-theoretic governance mechanisms as applied to publicly listed conglomerates operating under conditions of asymmetric information and dispersed ownership structures. Drawing on panel data from 214 multinational conglomerates across fourteen emerging and developed economies (2018–2023), the research employs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression framework augmented by propensity score matching to isolate causal governance effects. Findings indicate that stewardship-aligned board configurations significantly outperform incentive-contract-driven agency mechanisms in long-horizon value creation, particularly in high-uncertainty institutional environments. Conversely, agency-cost-minimizing structures demonstrate superior short-term earnings predictability. The study advances a contingency-based reconciliation model that integrates both paradigms, offering practitioner-relevant prescriptions for board design, executive compensation architecture, and shareholder engagement protocols.