From Shareholder Primacy to Stakeholder Governance: Dismantling the Agency Theory Orthodoxy in Post-Pandemic Corporate Strategy

Abstract

The enduring dominance of agency theory as the foundational logic of corporate governance has been subjected to unprecedented scrutiny following systemic market disruptions of the early 2020s. This study critically re-examines the shareholder primacy doctrine by employing a mixed-methods research design, integrating panel data analysis of 312 publicly listed firms across six OECD economies (2019–2024) with structured executive interviews. Findings reveal statistically significant correlations between stakeholder-inclusive governance frameworks and long-run firm resilience metrics, including risk-adjusted return on invested capital and organizational adaptive capacity. Contrary to prevailing agency-theoretic prescriptions, the evidence suggests that residual claimant hierarchies systematically undervalue relational capital and suppress managerial ambidexterity. The study advances a revised stakeholder governance model and offers actionable implications for board composition, fiduciary duty legislation, and executive incentive alignment.